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The National Banking System: A Brief History
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During the period of the National Banking System (1863–1913), national banks 
could issue bank notes backed by holdings of eligible U.S. government securities. 
This paper presents an overview of the legal and ﬁ  nancial history of this period. It 
begins with the reasons the National Banking System was created. It also examines 
the rules of operation for national banks as established by the National Banking 
Act and its subsequent revisions. Furthermore, the paper serves as a brief ﬁ  nancial 
history of the period, examining the various forces that shaped the environment in 
which national banks operated.
This paper represents a preliminary chapter from a forthcoming monograph on the 
period of the National Banking System. Other chapters of the monograph will ap-
pear in the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s working paper series.
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The founding of the National Banking System in 1863 represented an important
milestone in the development of the ﬁnancial infrastructure of the United States
economy. Although many of the features of this system were unique to its era, other
aspects of the system remain in eﬀect to this day.
This paper provides a summary of the important legislation that impacted national
banks during the national banking era.1 The emphasis will be on those aspects of the
legislation that had important inﬂuence on national bank behavior. The paper also
discusses the ﬁnancial history of the period as it relates to national bank operations.
2 Reasons for Establishing the National Banking
System
Before embarking on a detailed history of the period of the National Banking System,
a summary of the main reasons for the passage of the National Banking Acts should
prove useful. Brieﬂy, the main reasons for the establishment of the National Banking
System were:
• The creation of a uniform currency and
• The need for an eﬀective means of Civil War ﬁnancing.
The need for a uniform currency, one that would have an identical nominal value
regardless of the geographic location in which it was used in the United States, was
1 For those interested in the precise details of the legislation governing national bank operations,
see Huntington and Mawhinney (1910). This authoritative source contains the exact text of the
laws governing banking, coinage, and ﬁnance that were passed by the U.S. Congress from 1792 to
the time of its publication. The reader is also referred to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) for their
excellent general history of the national banking era and other periods in U.S. monetary history.
Additional references can be found at the end of the paper.
Appendix A presents a concise summary of the legislation related to national bank operations.
2well recognized practically from the country’s inception. Its attainment had been an
elusive one up to the Civil War years. Prior to the formation of the National Banking
System, the various currencies issued by state and private banks typically did not
circulate at par with one another.
Because of the diﬃculties this imposed on interregional trade, early leaders of the
country emphasized the need for a uniform currency. For example, James Madison
referred to the lack of a uniform currency in the period between the First Bank of the
United States (1791–1811) and the Second Bank of the United States (1816–1836).
It is, however, essential to every modiﬁcation of the ﬁnances that the beneﬁts of a
uniform national currency should be restored to the community.” (James Madison,
1815)
Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford emphasized the negative impact a
nonuniform currency had on interregional trade.
In referring to the causes which had the most decided inﬂuence in calling the United
States Bank into existence, the inconveniences resulting to the community from the
inequality in the rate of exchange between the diﬀerent sections of the Union stand
eminently prominent. (Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford, 1817, p. 540)
The National Banking System did provide for a uniform currency. National banks
were required by law to accept the notes of other national banks at par. This was
facilitated by a nationwide system of redemption centers beginning in 1874.
3 The Beginning of the Civil War
With the outbreak of war in April 1861, the common belief was that the Civil War
would be of short duration. In the North, it was felt that the superior industrial
strength of the North would lead to a quick victory over the predominantly agricul-
tural South. The South believed that northerners would not have the fortitude to
ﬁght a war.
3However, these beliefs proved not to be true, and expenditures related to the war
eﬀort quickly mounted. As seen in Table 1, the U.S. government budget quickly
swung into a large deﬁcit position. To ﬁnance escalating wartime expenditures, a
Table 1: U.S. Government Budget and Debt(millions of dollars)
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Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, Volume 5, Table Ea584–587.
special session of Congress passed the Act of July 17, 1861. This act authorized the
issuance of $250 million in either 6% 20-year bonds, 7.30% 3-year Treasury notes,
3.65% one-year notes, or noninterest-bearing notes redeemable on demand. Table 1
also shows the dramatic increase in government debt during the Civil War.
In December 1861, all banks and the government suspended specie payment, an
action which was looked upon as natural preparation for war in a country with a gold
standard as the monetary regime. Specie payments by the U.S. government would
not resume until 1879.
43.1 Wartime ﬁnancing and the Legal Tender Acts
As the war continued and escalated during 1861 and 1862, the need for increased
funds prompted passage of the Legal Tender Act of February 25, 1862. This act
provided for the issuance of $150 million in U.S. notes, dubbed “greenbacks,” which
were deemed “lawful money” by the establishing act.2 The lawful money feature
implied that these notes were receivable at par for all debts to the government.
Legal tender notes were also convertible into 6% 5-20-year bonds. In this act was
a provision for the reissuance of legal tender notes by the Treasury upon redemption
as well as for the outright issuance of $500 million of the 6% 5-20 bonds.
As with the Act of 1861, the Legal Tender Act appears to have been considered
as a temporary measure, which was to serve solely as a means of ﬁnancing the Civil
War. As Secretary of the Treasury Hugh McCullough wrote in December 1865, “the
present legal-tender acts...ought not to remain in force one day longer than shall be
necessary to enable the people to prepare for a return to the Constitutional Currency
[metallic coin].”3
4 The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864
The original National Banking Act was passed on February 25, 1863. This law was
found to contain many defects and was later amended in 1864. In a somewhat feeble
attempt to force the replacement of state bank notes with national bank notes and
to encourage the conversion of state banks to national banks, the 1863 law imposed
a two percent tax on state notes. In 1863, $238.7 million in state bank notes were
outstanding. This two percent tax was a factor in reducing this amount to $179.2
2This nickname “greenback” is attributable to the obverse of the legal tender notes, which was
printed in the green color familiar to all who have used U.S. currency to this day. The green ink
was introduced as an anti-counterfeiting device.
3Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (1865, p. 4).
5million a year later. The two percent tax proved insuﬃcient to force the conversion
of state banks to national bank status.
The amended version of the National Banking Act became law on June 3, 1864.
This version, although amended frequently, outlined the general environment in which
national banks operated. For this reason, a detailed description of the National
Banking Act of 1864 should prove fruitful.4
4.1 Capital requirements
Under the National Banking Act, any number of persons greater than or equal to ﬁve
could form a “national banking association.” Each banking association was subject to
minimum capital requirements dependent on the population of the locale in which the
bank was to be situated. Table 2 details the minimum capital requirements imposed
by the original act.5 One-half of the capital requirement was to be paid in cash
Table 2: Minimum Capital Requirements by Location
Population Minimum




before commencing business (so-called “paid-in capital”), and the rest could be paid
in monthly installments.
4See Appendix A at the end of this paper for a concise summary of the restrictions imposed on
national banks.
5The Act of March 14, 1900, allowed the establishment of national banks with minimum capital
requirements of $25,000 in locales with populations less than 3,000.
64.2 Note issuance
After satisfying capital requirements, a bank could then issue circulation according
to the following rules. Banks were required to deposit with the U.S. Treasury bonds
of certain classes to serve as collateral for note issuance. The qualifying bonds were
United States government registered bonds bearing interest in coupons of 5% or more
and were to be deposited to the amount of at least one-third of its capital (not less
than $30,000).6 This bond deposit would then serve as backing for bank notes which
could be issued up to an amount of 90% of the market value of the bonds deposited
(not to exceed 90% of par), but not to exceed the bank’s capital.7 The 90% value
was changed to 100% in 1900.
Initially, national bank notes could be issued in denominations of one to one
thousand dollars.8 However, only one-sixth of the bank notes outstanding could be in
denominations of less than ﬁve dollars; after the resumption of specie payments only
denominations greater than or equal to ﬁve dollars were to be allowed.9 National
bank notes were redeemable in lawful money and were receivable for all public debts
except the payment of customs duties. In addition, the U.S. government could use
national bank notes for all payments except for interest on the public debt and the
redemption of U.S. notes. National banks were to receive each other’s notes at par
6The Act of July 12, 1870, explicitly eliminated the requirement that the bonds bear interest of
5% or more. After that date, bonds deposited with the Treasury could be “of any description of
bonds of the U.S. bearing interest in cash.” The bonds still had to be registered bonds, but coupon
bonds could be converted to registered bonds at any point in time.
7Since eligible bonds typically displayed market prices in excess of par during the period, the par
valuation constraint was normally binding.
8More speciﬁcally, national bank notes originally could be issued in denominations of $1, $2, $5,
$10, $20, $50, $100, $500, and $1,000.
9Although it was originally expected that specie payments would resume shortly after the con-
clusion of the Civil War, it took some time to achieve this goal. Specie payments resumed in
1879. The original act undoubtedly allowed the issuance of national bank notes in one- and two-
dollar denominations due to the disappearance of small-denomination coin during the Civil War.
Small-denomination national bank notes were slowly taken out of circulation beginning in 1879. See
Section 6 for more.
7but were not required to pay out notes of banks that failed to redeem their own notes
on demand.
Initially, the volume of national bank notes was limited to $300 million. Note is-
suance was apportioned to the states according to population, bank capital, resources,
and other factors.10
4.3 Reserve requirements
National banks had to hold reserves against their deposits and, originally, against
their circulation.11 The National Banking Act organized the reserve system into
three distinct tiers. The top tier consisted of banks located in central reserve cities.
New York City was the only central reserve city speciﬁed in the original act. Chicago
and St. Louis became central reserve cities in 1887. The middle tier of banks were
deemed reserve city banks. Eighteen reserve cities were established by the original
act.12 The number of reserve cities increased over time to a total of 47 by the end
of the period.13 The bottom tier consisted of the remaining banks, called country
banks.
Reserve requirements depended on the tier in which the bank resided. Central
10Half of the circulation was to be apportioned according to population; the remainder according
to existing bank capital, resources, and “business” of each state. The apportionment of circulation
was undoubtedly a concession to those outside the ﬁnancial centers. Many acts of this period placed
checks on the powers given to New York ﬁnancial establishments.
11The reserve requirement on note issue was eliminated by the Act of June 20, 1874, which
established the ﬁve percent redemption fund. See Section 5.3 for more detail on the ﬁve percent
redemption fund.
12The original reserve cities were Saint Louis, Louisville, Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, New Or-
leans, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, Albany, Leavenworth,
San Francisco, Washington City (present day Washington, DC). The 1864 act also speciﬁed that
Charleston and Richmond “may be added to the list of [reserve] cities...whenever, in the opinion
of the Comptroller of the Currency, the condition of the Southern States will warrant it.”
13After 1887, a city of a certain population became eligible to become a central reserve city or
reserve city. Designation as a central reserve city or as a reserve city required approval by 3/4 of
the national banks operating in the city and by the Comptroller of the Currency. Only cities with a
population of 200,000 were eligible to become central reserve cities. For reserve cities, the minimum
population was 50,000.
8reserve city banks and reserve city banks were required to hold 25% reserves against
deposits. Reserve city banks could hold half of their reserves as deposits in a central
reserve city bank. Reserve requirements for country banks were 15% of deposits.
Country banks could hold three-ﬁfths of their reserves as deposits in reserve city
banks or central reserve city banks.
The redemption of national bank notes was to take place at designated reserve
agencies.14 In addition, certain banks were designated as depositories of public money.
Such banks were required to hold U.S. government bonds as “satisfactory security”
for governmental deposits.
The structure of reserve requirements came under criticism during the period and
was viewed by many as one of the primary defects of the National Banking System.
This view, most clearly expressed by Sprague (1910), focused on the “pyramiding
of reserves” that this structure allowed and promoted. It was common for banks in
reserve and central reserve cities to pay 2% interest on bankers’ balances, the deposits
of other banks. Hence, a signiﬁcant fraction of reserves tended to accumulate in banks
located in the reserve and central reserve cities, with a large proportion of bankers’
balances concentrating in New York City where those deposits were often lent in the
form of call loans. In Sprague’s view, this placed the reserve city banks and the entire
system in a precarious situation. Sprague stated,
It is clear, then, that with this situation in New York an emergency would cause
serious disturbance if it should lead to the withdrawal of any considerable amount by
the outside banks [reserve and country banks].... Every year furnished ample evidence
that the outside banks had a strong preference for reducing their balances with agents
rather than their own cash reserves when their depositors resorted to them for even
very moderate supplies of money. (Sprague 1910, pp. 18–19)
14A more formal redemption system was established in 1874.
94.4 Taxes on national banks
An annual tax of 1% (levied semianually) was imposed on national bank note circula-
tion. In addition, there was a tax of 0.5% on capital and deposits. It is important to
note that the tax on notes only applied to notes outside the bank’s vault. Idle notes
held as inventory in a bank’s vault were not subject to taxation.
5 The Early Years (1864–1881)
By the end of 1864, 638 national banks had been chartered with total capital exceeding
$135 million. Circulation of national bank notes was $67 million. However, state bank
notes still circulated in large numbers despite the existence of the two percent tax on
their circulation; and, apparently, state banks had no trouble redeeming their notes
in greenbacks. This dual system of coexistent state and national bank notes was
deemed to be undesirable—a major reason for enacting the National Banking Act
was to provide a uniform currency. Consequently, on March 3, 1865, a 10% tax on
state bank notes was imposed. This tax quickly led to the disappearance of the state
bank note. In 1865 circulation of state notes stood at $143 million. By 1866 this
number was $20 million and by 1867, $4 million. The Act of March 3, 1865, also
set limits on each national bank’s circulation as a percentage of its paid-in capital.
Table 3 details the limits imposed an a circulation by a bank’s level of paid-in capital.
Concern began to develop throughout 1866 regarding legal tender notes. These
notes were interest-bearing and national banks held large quantities of them to satisfy
reserve requirements. These legal tender notes matured in 1867 and fears arose that
their retirement could lead to a strong contraction of the currency. Therefore, on
March 2, 1867, an act was passed by Congress authorizing the issuance of $50 million
10Table 3: Limits on Notes Issued as a Percent of Paid-in Capital
Paid-in Notes Issued as a Percent
Capital of Paid-in Capital
< 500,000 Up to 90%
500,000–999,999 Up to 80%
1,000,000–2,999,999 Up to 75%
≥ 3,000,000 Up to 60%
in 3% temporary loan certiﬁcates. These certiﬁcates were payable on demand and
served as legal reserves for national banks. The authorization was extended by an
additional $25 million by the Act of July 25, 1868. Also, in February of 1868, Congress
suspended the retirement of greenbacks, a process which had been transpiring since
late 1865; the quantity was then ﬁxed at $356 million. Many of these actions during
1867 and 1868 were to facilitate the move toward resumption of specie payment.
By 1868, national bank notes in circulation amounted to over $290 million, a ﬁgure
which was approaching the $300 million limit established by the original National
Banking Act. Concern developed over the consequences of reaching this ﬁxed upper
bound. As a temporary measure, on February 10, 1869, an act was passed which
allowed no new national banks to be formed unless currently existing banks failed.
However, outcries over an “inelasticity” of the currency still were heard, and, in
response, the Act of July 12, 1870, was enacted.This act increased the maximum cir-
culation of national bank notes by $54 million, to $354 million. As noted above, the
National Banking Act provided for apportionment of national bank note circulation
between states. The Act of July 12, 1870, also provided for a reapportionment of cir-
culation, removing bank notes from states with more than their share and reassigning
this circulation to states with less than their share. Eastern and Middle states were
11declared to have an excess of $80 million and Southern states were deﬁcient by some
$57 million. In addition, the act provided for the issuance of gold notes.15
5.1 The Crime of ’73
The Act of February 12, 1873, discontinued coinage of the standard silver dollar. This
act eventually would be popularly referred to as the “Crime of ’73.”16 Except for a
minor amount of subsidiary coin, silver had not been in circulation since 1836 due to
the fact that the market price of silver exceeded its mint price since that year. Hence,
on the surface, the passage of this act seemed innocuous and, in fact, was not strongly
debated in Congress.17 It was not until after its enactment that the act became a
“crime.”
Shortly after the Act of 1873’s passage came signiﬁcant ﬁnds of silver in the
Comstock Lode of Nevada. The market price of silver began to fall, substanitally
enough that resumption of silver coinage looked like a good idea to silver producers
and the Act of 1873 looked more and more like a “crime” to them. Silver proponents
lobbied strongly for the free coinage of silver at the 1836 mint price. This began
the period of silver agitation in the United States. Silver agitation would continue
15It is also interesting to note other measures that were introduced but defeated during the 1870
Congressional session. Among the proposals defeated during the debate on the Act of July 12, 1870,
were to:
1. repeal the 10% tax on state bank notes,
2. ﬁx maximum discount rates at 7%,
3. prohibit payment of interest on deposits,
4. remove interest payments on bonds while on deposit with the Treasury as backing for bank
notes, and
5. substitute U.S. notes for national bank notes.
These proposals illustrate the wide variety of sentiments concerning banking prevalent during the
late 1800s.
16A fascinating discussion of the Crime of ’73 and the debate over silver appears in Friedman (1992,
Chapter 3).
17The act passed by votes of 110 to 13 in the U.S. House of Representatives and 36 to 14 in the
U.S. Senate.
12through the mid-1890s. During the late 1870s silver proponents began to have some
successes, beginning with the Bland-Allison Act in 1878, discussed in Section 6.
5.2 The crisis of 1873
National bank note circulation continued to climb from nearly $292 million in 1869 to
almost $339 million in 1873. However, in this period, the nation encountered its ﬁrst
ﬁnancial crisis under the National Banking System. These banking crises were not
a new phenomenon for the United States—banking crises had occurred during the
state banking era as recently as 1837 and 1857. Much of the subsequent discussion
of the crisis of 1873 and the crises that followed during 1893 and 1907 is due to
Sprague (1910).
As was typical during the early fall months, September 1872 saw heavy with-
drawals of currency for crop-moving purposes. Banks responded in a typical manner
by contracting loans. However, during 1872, these currency withdrawals appeared
more severe than in previous years. By the end of September, the U.S. government
entered the picture in an attempt to remedy this pressure by selling gold and buying
bonds ($5 million of each). Apparently, this did temporarily relieve the situation.
However, during March and April of 1873, interior banks withdrew funds from
banks in the East, primarily those in New York City. This action also was typical
year-to-year and was associated with the spring planting season. However, it was the
large magnitudes of 1873 that were unusual. This precipitated a large contraction
of loans by New York City banks. Toward the end of April currency ﬂowed back
eastward, somewhat relieving the situation. The true crisis began in September 1873,
beginning with the failures of numerous brokerage ﬁrms. This resulted in a closing
of the stock exchange for a period of ten days. Specie reserves of national banks fell
“by $14 million or 50% in four weeks, and deposits declined by $50 million, or 28%,
13in the same period”, according to Timberlake (1978).18
Banks began at this time to issue clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates, devices to settle
interbank balances. These certiﬁcates had ﬁrst been used during the crisis of 1857.
This action eased the situation by making the reserves of all banks available to any
threatened bank. As a further measure, the U.S. government reissued $26 million in
greenbacks. These combined actions helped the National Banking System survive its
ﬁrst crisis.
5.3 The ﬁve percent bank note redemption fund
In 1874, a more formal system was put in place to facilitate the redemption of national
bank notes. The Act of June 20, 1874, stipulated that in lieu of the required reserve of
lawful money for the redemption of national bank notes, lawful money to the extent
of ﬁve percent of bank notes outstanding was to be deposited with the Treasury. The
ﬁve percent fund counted to fulﬁlling the reserve requirement on deposits. The act
abolished reserve requirements on bank note circulation.
With passage of this law, redemption of national bank notes would be through
the U.S. Treasury instead of through reserve agents. Banks also could deposit with
the Treasury lawful money for the reduction or retirement of their outstanding bank
notes and receive in return the bonds which were held as security.19 Included in this
act was a $382 million limit on U.S. notes (greenbacks) and a further reapportionment
of national bank notes among states. Also, the costs of redeeming bank notes were
now to be borne by the national banks. A free banking amendment was defeated
during the debate of this bill.
18See Timberlake (1978, p. 105).
19Before passage of the Act of June 20, 1874, national banks were required to notify the Treasury
of an intent to retire currency and quantify the amount of the reduction. The banks did not receive
the bonds which served as backing until the Treasury received the speciﬁed number of bank notes
to be retired.
145.4 Repeal of limits on national bank notes outstanding
During 1874, concern remained regarding the ability of banks to expand circulation.
National bank notes were limited to a total circulation of $354 million by the Act
of 1870, and in 1874 the outstanding circulation stood at $340 million. Partially in
response to this, the Specie Resumption Law was passed on January 14, 1875. This
act repealed all limits on the volume of national bank notes. This law also explicitly
eliminated the continual problem of bank note reapportionment.
The act further provided for the retirement of legal tender notes to an amount
of 80% of new national bank notes issued until the quantity of greenbacks reached
$300 million. At the time of the act’s passage, over $350 million in greenbacks were
in circulation. Specie payment on legal tender notes in excess of the $300 million was
resumed and beginning on January 1, 1879, redemption in coin would resume on all
U.S. legal tender notes.20 The act also authorized the formation of a gold reserve
established through the sale of bonds and use of surplus revenues by the Treasury.
5.5 Bland-Allison Act of 1878
Few major laws concerning banking were passed during the next few years through
1877. National bank note circulation ﬂuctuated between $320 and $350 million during
the period from 1875 through 1878. February 1878 saw passage of the Bland-Allison
Act (also referred to as the Silver Purchase and Coinage Act) which stipulated that
the Treasury would purchase between two and four million dollars worth of silver per
month. This resulted from intense political pressures for the use of silver. Silver prices
had fallen due to major ﬁnds in Nevada and reduced demands. Free silver forces were
nonetheless unhappy with the law since it did not allow for unlimited coinage. By
20For an excellent description of the process of specie resumption, see Timberlake (1978, pp. 112–
113).
151881, $29.3 million in silver dollars were in circulation.
The Bland-Allison Act also stipulated that a holder of silver coin could deposit
their holdings with the U.S. Treasury and receive silver certiﬁcates in denominations
as low as $10.21 Lower-denomination silver certiﬁcates were issued beginning in 1886.
Silver dollars were deemed legal tender, but silver certiﬁcates were not. Because of
this, questions remained as to whether silver certiﬁcates qualiﬁed as “lawful money.”
Lawful money was construed to be money accepted by the federal government in
payment of taxes. Classiﬁcation of a form of money as lawful money was important for
national banks because only lawful money holdings satisﬁed legal reserve requirements
and the ﬁve percent redemption fund established in 1874 (see Section 5.3). During
1879, extensive debates evolved as to what exactly constituted lawful money. On one
side of the debate were those who contended that lawful money consisted solely of
metal coins and, on the other side, legal tender notes (greenbacks) and metal coins.
The presence of silver certiﬁcates further complicated this issue, and its lawful money
status was contested for many years. Its status eventually was clariﬁed by the Act of
July 12, 1882.
In May of 1878, the further retirement of greenbacks was prohibited, with their
quantity then ﬁxed at $346.7 million. This posted another victory for the pro-
greenback forces in their seesaw battle with their opponents. At this time there was
strong sentiment against national banks, and this act as well as the Bland-Allison
Act could be seen as means to inhibit national bank note issuance. In fact, in 1878, a
bill was introduced in Congress that would have totally replaced national bank note
circulation by greenbacks.
In January 1879, the exchange at par of 4% bonds for the 6% 5-20’s began, and in
21The Bland-Allison Act allowed silver certiﬁcates in denominations of $10, $20, $50, $100, $500,
and $1,000.
16February 1879, the Treasury began to issue, in exchange for lawful money, certiﬁcates
of deposit bearing interest at 4%. These certiﬁcates were convertible at any time into
4% bonds. During the summer of 1881, $538 million of 5 and 6% bonds were extended
at a 3.5% coupon rate, redeemable “at the pleasure of the government.” The 3.5%
bonds were commonly held as backing for national bank notes.
6 Extension of the National Bank Charters
In a move to extend the charter of existing national banks for an additional twenty
years, the Act of July 12, 1882, was passed. This act also limited the number of
national bank notes which could be retired to three million dollars per month, except
when particular classes of bonds which were held as security for circulation were called
by the Treasury. Further, a national bank that retired any portion of its circulation
could not then increase its circulation for a period of six months. The total amount
of notes issued by any single bank as a percent of its paid-in capital stock was lowered
from 100% to 90%. In addition, the act authorized the exchange of an equal amount
of 3% bonds for outstanding 3.5% bonds. These new bonds were also callable on
demand by the government.
The Act of July 12, 1882, also changed the denominations of national bank notes.
The original National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 permitted the issuance of na-
tional bank notes in denominations of $1, $2, $5, $10, $20, $50, $100, $500, and
$1,000. However, only one-sixth of the aggregate issuance could be in one- and two-
dollar denominations.
Beginning with the resumption of specie payments in 1879, national banks were
forbidden from issuing new notes in denominations of less than $5. However, sig-
niﬁcant amounts of one- and two-dollar notes remained in circulation. To eliminate
17this low-denomination circulation, the Act of July 12, 1882, required all national
bank notes to go through the redemption process through the U.S. Treasury. As
the Treasury received the old notes, they were replaced with notes of a new design.
All ones and twos were destroyed during the redemption process. This action nearly
eliminated the small-denomination national bank notes within a few years and only
denominations of ﬁve dollars and more remained. At that time, a ﬁve-dollar note was
roughly equivalent to a week’s wages for a laborer.22
The Act of July 12, 1882, also clariﬁed the lawful money status of silver certiﬁ-
cates. The Comptroller of the Currency in his annual report of 1882 stated, “silver
certiﬁcates... are authorized to be counted as part of the lawful reserves of national
banks.”23
6.1 The emergence of government surpluses
Earlier in the period of the National Banking System, the U.S. government found itself
in a deﬁcit budgetary position mainly due to the Civil War. Figure 1 illustrates the
budgetary position of the U.S. government from 1864 to 1914. During the early 1880s
surpluses began to appear and the outstanding government debt was being retired.
In that this debt provided backing for national bank notes, concern developed. In
fact, Treasury Secretary Chase stated
If the public debt is to be paid hereafter as rapidly as during the past three years,
all of the interest-bearing bonds will soon be surrendered and canceled, and there is
danger that the bank circulation will be so rapidly retired as to cause a contraction of
the currency.... (Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 1882, p. 40)
22See Series D 735–738 in U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1975. Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 1, Washington, D.C.
23Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1882, p. 44.)
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6.2 The crisis of 1884
In May of 1884, a minor crisis hit the ﬁnancial community. There were numerous re-
ports of suspensions of payment, among those being suspensions by two large banks.
The crisis was attributed to undue expansion of loans induced by speculation in se-
curities. Banks issued clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates to settle debit balances between
banks, an action which, as in 1873, eased the situation.
Relatively few changes or major disturbances occurred in the period from 1885-
1889. During this period, national bank note circulation fell year to year until in
1889 it was $207.2 million. Friedman and Schwartz attribute this to the “use of the
surplus to retire the debt,” as noted above.24
24Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 132)
196.3 Low-denomination silver certiﬁcates authorized
Recall that low-denomination national bank notes were practically eliminated from
circulation by 1882. Four years later, Congress authorized the issuance of low-
denomination silver certiﬁcates. The Act of August 4, 1886, permitted the U.S.
Treasury to issue silver certiﬁcates in denominations of $1, $2, and $5, in addition
to the higher denomination silver certiﬁcates authorized by the Bland-Allison Act of
1878.
6.4 Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890
Silver agitation continued to be a potent political force as the United States entered
the 1890s. Silver proponents argued for an increase in the rate of silver purchases.
With the entry of several key western states into the Union during 1889 and 1890,
silver advocates had increased political clout. In a political compromise, the Sherman
Silver Purchase Act of 1890 was passed by Congress. In exchange for Republican
support of the purchase act, Democrats casted votes for the protectionist McKinley
tariﬀ.
The Sherman Silver Purchase Act mandated the purchase of 4.5 million ounces
of silver per month at its market price. Eﬀectively, this act more than doubled the
rate of silver purchases by the Treasury. The amount of silver purchases authorized
by the Sherman Silver Purchase Act represented nearly the monthly production of
the silver mines of the United States. The silver bullion was to be paid for with U.S.
Treasury notes (commonly called the Treasury notes of 1890) in denominations from
one dollar to one thousand dollars. These Treasury notes were redeemable in gold
or silver coin and could be reissued. They were also deemed legal tender as well as
lawful money and therefore satisﬁed reserve requirements for national bank notes.
206.5 The panic of 1893
During 1891 and 1892, two major sources of uncertainty plagued the ﬁnancial com-
munity. Gold had been ﬂowing out of the Treasury and out of the country, and gold
reserves were falling dangerously low. In fact, by 1893, gold reserves fell below $100
million, a situation which made the redemption of legal tender notes increasingly
diﬃcult. The public becqme apprehensive as to whether the gold standard could
be maintained. Also, during this period, serious attempts were made in Congress
to restore state bank notes, actions which added further uncertainty, especially for
national banks.
The year 1893 also found the banking system experiencing another ﬁnancial crisis.
Sprague (1910), in his authoritative analysis of banking panics during the national
banking era, identiﬁes three stages of the crisis. In the ﬁrst stage, the disturbance was
largely conﬁned to New York City and was marked by declining stock market prices
and a contraction of loans. The loan contraction generally improved the position of
most New York banks. However, in the second stage, reserves of New York banks
fell by $40 million, mainly due to withdrawal of funds by depositors in the West
and South. Some New York banks had reserves fall below the legal requirement
on deposits. In response, about $100 million in clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates were
issued. In the third stage, beginning with banks located in New York, banks across
the country partially suspended payment. Sprague writes, “As soon as all banks made
use of that medium [clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates], the suspension of the banks which
had large numbers of correspondents became inevitable.”25 During August of 1893,
when suspensions abounded, currency sold at a premium.
25Sprague (1910, p. 182).
216.6 Silver purchase act repealed
The arguments over silver continued during the 1890s. Opponents of silver suggested
an asset-backed currency with complete backing by the U.S. government. President
Grover Cleveland, who reassumed oﬃce in March 1893, had made it clear in prior
statements that he was opposed to the silver legislation.26 The market price of silver
had continued to fall throughout the 1880s and early 1890s. By 1893, the market
price of silver was nearly one-half its mint price.
This situation caused a continual drain of gold from the Treasury. By the early
1890s the Treasury’s ability to redeem currency into gold was called into question. On
April 22, 1893, the Treasury’s gold reserve fell below the $100 million mark. Although
it was not mandated by law, Secretaries of the Treasury viewed $100 million dollars
as the minimum amount that should be held in the gold reserve.27 This prompted
President Cleveland to order a special session of Congress in August 1893. In a
message to Congress, Cleveland argued for repeal of the Sherman Silver Purchase
Act of 1890. The Act of November 1, 1893, made the repeal formal. However, the
conversion of silver coin into silver certiﬁcates was still allowed.
In 1894, Treasury Secretary Carlisle proposed a plan that would
Repeal all laws requiring, or authorizing, the deposit of U.S. bonds as security for
circulation. [It would] permit national banks to issue notes up to an amount not
exceeding 75% of their paid-up and unimpaired capital, but require each bank before
receiving notes to deposit a guarantee fund consisting of legal tender notes, including
Treasury notes of 1890, to the amount of 30% upon the circulating notes applied
for.... [And] repeal the provisions of the reorganization act of July 12, 1882, imposing
26During his State of the Union address to Congress in December 1885, Cleveland made the
following remarks on silver: “Those who do not fear any disastrous consequences arising from the
continued compulsory coinage of silver as now directed by law, and who suppose that the addition to
the currency of the country intended as its result will be a public beneﬁt, are reminded that history
demonstrates that the point is easily reached in the attempt to ﬂoat at the same time two sorts of
money of diﬀerent excellence when the better will cease to be in general circulation. The hoarding
of gold which has already taken place indicates that we shall not escape the usual experience in such
cases.”
27See Taussig (1893, p. 734).
22limitations upon the reduction and increase of national bank circulation. The Secretary
of the Treasury may, in his discretion, use any surplus revenue of the United States in
the redemption and retirement of U.S. legal tender notes, but such redemptions shall
not in the aggregate exceed an amount equal to 70% of the additional circulation taken
out by national and state banks.... (Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury
1894, pp. LXXVI–LXXVIII).
In addition, Carlisle proposed abolition of legal reserve requirements. Carlisle claimed
that his proposal would provide a more elastic currency and would lead to a gradual
retirement of legal tender notes.
In 1896, the free-silver Presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan was de-
feated. To some extent, this may have reduced the uncertainty with regard to which
standard, gold or silver, the U.S. government would pursue. During 1896, world gold
production and prices both increased rapidly. In June of 1898, the Treasury issued
$200 million of 3% bonds (the 3s of 1908) to ﬁnance the Spanish-American War.
7 Marked Expansion (1900–1914)
The turmoil of silver agitation essentially ended on March 14, 1900, with passage
of the Gold Standard Act. Speciﬁcally, the Gold Standard Act set a dollar equal
to 25.8 grains of gold. All other forms of currency were to be maintained at parity
with this value. A reserve fund of $150 million in gold was established. If the fund
subsequently fell below $100 million, the Treasury was authorized to sell 3% (or
less in annual percentage) coupon rate bonds payable in gold at the pleasure of the
government.
The Gold Standard Act also changed the rule regarding the deposit of bonds
as backing. Upon depositing U.S. bonds with the Treasury, a national bank would
receive bank notes equal to 100% of the par or market value, whichever was less, of
the bonds deposited. (Previously, the percentage was 90%.) The total value of the
notes issued by any bank could not exceed the bank’s paid-in capital. An annual tax
23of 0.5% (levied semiannually) on a bank’s average number of notes outstanding was
imposed. However, this tax only applied to notes which used the new 2% bonds (the
2s of 1930 or any subsequent 2% issue) as security; all circulation based on bonds with
coupon rates greater than 2% were still subject to the old annual tax rate of 1%. This
diﬀerential tax treatment quickly accomplished its purpose of placing newly-issued
2% bonds as banks substituted the 2s of 1930 for their other holdings of bonds.
7.1 Increased Treasury inﬂuence
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the power of the Treasury in ﬁnancial matters
increased immensely, much to the dismay of many. Secretaries of the Treasury pro-
posed extensive changes in the banking system and implemented many of their own
suggestions. For example, in 1901, Treasury Secretary Gage, dissatisﬁed with the
lack of cohesion among banks, especially during crises, wrote, “Can not the principle
of federation be applied under which the banks as individual units, preserving their
independence of action in local relationship, may yet be united in a great central in-
stitution?”28 It is interesting to note the organizational resemblance between Gage’s
ideal and that of the Federal Reserve System which would not come into existence
for another twelve years.
Treasury inﬂuence continued to grow when in 1902 Leslie Shaw became Trea-
sury Secretary under appointment by Theodore Roosevelt. He pledged to increase
Treasury deposits with national banks and proceeded to fulﬁll that pledge. By law,
national banks were required to hold “U.S. bonds and otherwise” as collateral on
these public deposits. Timberlake claims that this increase in Treasury deposits “in-
creased demand for the given stock of government securities, raised security prices,
28Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury (1901, p. 77).
24and tended to diminish national bank note circulation.”29 Shaw allowed state and
municipal bonds to be held at 75% of face value as collateral for Treasury deposits,
thus freeing U.S. bonds for use as security for circulation.
Shaw also used Treasury policies as an instrument to expand and contract bank
reserves on a seasonal basis. For example, in the fall of 1902, $70 million of government
debt was repurchased at 137% of par as a means to bolster insuﬃcient legal reserves
of banks. Shaw’s policies drew numerous criticisms claiming that he was meddling in
business aﬀairs and that he showed favoritism with respect to which banks received
public deposits. However, Shaw, despite these criticisms, continued his policies.
In 1907, George Cortelyou assumed the position of Secretary of the Treasury. He
followed Shaw’s policies, but it is questionable whether his seasonal Treasury deposits
with banks were as well-timed as those of Shaw, as is evidenced by the crisis that
developed in that year. On March 4, 1907, an act was passed which provided for the
issuance of gold certiﬁcates when the reserve fund of gold bullion was greater than
$100 million.
7.2 The panic of 1907
The late 1890s and early 1900s saw the growth of several large trust companies. This
presented the possibility of large withdrawals from New York banks, not only by
interior banks, but also by the trust companies which held large deposits in those
banks. Beginning in October 1907 a number of the largest trust companies experi-
enced runs by depositors. Banks then, in turn, were confronted by withdrawals by
trust companies and individual depositors, simultaneous to the normal fall ﬂow of
liquidity westward to fund crop movements. In fact, some banks experienced such
large withdrawals that they were forced to suspend payments. For some reason, at
29Timberlake (1978, pp. 176–77).
25this time, the issuance of clearinghouse loan certiﬁcates was delayed. Quickly, alarm
over the circumstances spread to other parts of the country. As mentioned before,
during previous crises currency had sold at a premium. Expectations of this reoccur-
ring compounded the problem as many depositors withdrew currency for speculative
reasons. And, in fact, during the 1907 crisis premiums on currency ran as high as
four percent. Sprague attributes the massive suspensions that followed to the failure
to issue clearing house loan certiﬁcates at the beginning of the crisis.30 By late 1907
almost all banks had suspended payment. The crisis of 1907 was by far the worst
that the National Banking System had experienced and prompted numerous cries for
reform of the banking system.
7.3 The Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908
In response to the 1907 crisis, Congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908
which, in eﬀect, established an “emergency currency” which would hopefully avert
future crises. Speciﬁcally, this act stated that national banks “having unimpaired
capital and a surplus of not less than 20%, not less than ten in number, having
an aggregate capital and surplus of at least ﬁve million dollars, may form voluntary
associations to be called national currency associations.” (Huntington and Mawhinney
1910, p. 32)
Those banks allowed could use securities designated by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury, including commercial paper, as a basis for circulation, issuing up to 75% of the
cash value of these securities in currency. State, city, town, country, or other munici-
pal bonds also qualiﬁed as backing for circulation and notes could be issued on these
securities up to 90% of their market value. Other national banks could apply to the
Comptroller of the Currency for authority to issue notes secured by bonds other than
30See Sprague (1910, pp. 270–72).
26U.S. bonds. The Comptroller would then transfer this application to the Secretary
of the Treasury who, upon ascertaining whether business conditions in the locality of
the bank required additional circulation, may grant permission. These other banks
which received permission could issue circulation up to 90% of the par value of the
securities deposited.
The act limited the total additional emergency circulation to $500 million. The 5%
redemption fund also applied to this circulation and the notes were to be apportioned
throughout the country. Circulation secured by other than U.S. bonds was subject
to a tax of 5% per year for the ﬁrst month, and an additional 1% per year for each
succeeding month, up to 10% per year. It was this clause which shows that the act
was intended to provide for emergency circulation during the time of a crisis. The tax
was designed to hasten the retirement of the newly-issued notes as the crisis waned.
The features of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act were only tested once before the act’s
expiration on June 30, 1915. This occurred with the outbreak of World War I. The
closing of the stock exchange on July 31, 1914, precipitated large withdrawals of cur-
rency by country banks from city banks. As soon as bank runs began, emergency
circulation was issued. By late November, over $400 million in emergency currency
had been issued. As Friedman and Schwartz state, “To judge by that one episode,
the Aldrich-Vreeland Act provided an eﬀective device for solving a threatened in-
terconvertibility crisis without monetary contraction or widespread bank failures.”
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, p. 172)
During the remaining period of the National Banking System, numerous proposals
to reform the banking system were discussed. These discussions had actually been
taking place since the mid-1890s with the presentation of the so-called Baltimore Plan
by the American Bankers Association. The proposals culminated with the passage of
the Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913. This marked the end of the National
27Banking System.
28A Main Features of the National Banking Act
This appendix details many of the important features of the National Banking Act
and subsequent changes in the laws regarding national banks. The dates found within
the appendix refer to the date the speciﬁc law or amendment was enacted.31
A.1 Minimum Capital Requirements
The National Banking Act speciﬁed minimum capital requirements for a bank to
obtain a national charter. The Act of June 3, 1864, stated that those requirements
depended on the population of a bank’s locale according to:




As of March 14, 1900, the establishment of national banks with minimum capital
requirements of $25,000 was allowed in locales with populations less than 3,000.
A.2 Minimum Bond Deposit
The National Banking Act required national banks to deposit a minimum quantity
of eligible bonds with the U.S. Treasury before commencing business.
June 3, 1864 Requires the deposit of registered bonds to an amount not
less than $30,000 nor less than one-third of paid-in capital
July 12, 1882 Banks with a paid-in capital less than $150,000 are required
to hold only a minimum of bonds equal to one-fourth the
value of their paid-in capital.
31The primary source for this material is Huntington and Mawhinney (1910).
29A.3 Constraints on Bank Note Issue
A.3.1 Limits on aggregate quantity of notes outstanding
The original National Banking Acts placed limits on the aggregate quantity of notes
that could be issued by national banks. These limits were revised in 1870 and elimi-
nated in 1874.
February 25, 1863 $300 million
July 12, 1870 $354 million
January 14, 1875 Limits repealed
A.3.2 Limits on note issue for individual banks
The Act of July 12, 1870, set the maximum circulation for any single national bank
at $500,000.
A.3.3 Limits on circulation based on bonds deposited as backing
National bank notes were fully backed by holdings of U.S. government bonds. The
amount of notes returned to the issuing bank for a given deposit of bonds was speciﬁed
as:
February 25, 1863 80% of the “value” of the bonds despited (The act is am-
biguous as to the meaning of “value,” par or market value.)
June 3, 1864 90% of the par or market value, whichever was lower, of the
bonds deposited
March 14, 1900 100% of the par or market value, whichever was lower, of the
bonds deposited
30A.3.4 Limits on circulation based on paid-in capital
A national bank’s paid-in capital also imposed limits on the amount of notes it could
issue, according to:
June 3, 1864 Up to 100% of paid-in capital
March 3, 1865 Dependent on the magnitude of paid-in capital of a bank
according to:
Notes Issued as a Percent
Paid-in Capital ($) of Paid-in Capital
< 500,000 Up to 100%
500,000–999,999 Up to 80%
1,000,000-2,999,999 Up to 75%
≥ 3,000,000 Up to 60%
A.4 Limits on the Withdrawal of Circulation
A national bank could reduce its notes outstanding by depositing lawful money with
the U.S. Treasury. The bonds held as backing would be returned to the bank. Notes
sent to the Treasury for redemption would be withdrawn from circulation until the
total reduction in notes was complete. Any bank that reduced its circulation could
not subsequently expand its circulation for a period of six months.
The Act of July 12, 1882, limited the aggregate quantity of circulation that could
be withdrawn to $3 million per month (unless the bonds used as backing were called
for redemption). The Act of March 14, 1900, increased this limit to $6 million per
month.
A.5 Taxes
The National Banking Act imposed taxes on national bank notes as well as on national
bank holdings of deposits and capital.
31A.5.1 Taxes on circulation
June 3, 1864 One percent annual tax on the average amount of notes in
circulation, levied semiannually
March 14, 1900 Notes backed by two percent coupon rate bonds: one-half
percent annual tax, levied semiannually. Notes backed by
other bonds: one percent annual tax, levied semiannually
A.5.2 Taxes on deposits
June 3, 1864 One-half percent annual tax on the average amount of de-
posits, levied semiannually
A.5.3 Taxes on capital
June 3, 1864 One-half percent annual tax on the average amount of a
bank’s capital stock beyond the amount invested in govern-
ment bonds, levied semiannually
A.6 Reserve Requirements
The National Banking Act organized the reserve system into three distinct tiers.
The top tier consisted of banks located in central reserve cities. New York City was
speciﬁed as the only central reserve city in the original act, Chicago and St. Louis
becoming central reserve cities in 1887. The middle tier of banks were deemed reserve
city banks. Eighteen reserve cities were established by the original act. The number
of reserve cities increased over time to a total of 47 by the end of the period. The
bottom tier consisted of the remaining banks, called country banks.
Required reserves were to be held in the form of lawful money, which initially
consisted of gold or silver coin and U.S. notes. Eventually, gold and silver certiﬁcates
also would qualify as lawful money.
32June 3, 1864: Under this act, reserve requirements were dependent on a bank’s




25% of national bank note circulation and deposits,
all in bank
Reserve city banks 25% of national bank note circulation and deposits
(one-half of the 25% could be held as deposits with
a correspondent bank in a central reserve city, rest in
bank)
Country banks 15% of national bank note circulation and deposits
(three-ﬁfths of the 15% could be held as deposits with
a correspondent bank in a reserve or central reserve
city, rest in bank)
June 20, 1874: Repealed reserve requirements on national bank note circulation,
maintaining reserve requirements on deposits according to the above three tiers. The
5% bank note redemption fund established by this act was declared to count toward
satisfying legal reserve requirements.
32After 1887, a city of a certain population became eligible to become a central reserve city or
reserve city. Designation as a central reserve city or as a reserve city required approval by 3/4 of
the national banks operating in the city and by the Comptroller of the Currency. Only cities with a
population of 200,000 were eligible to become central reserve cities. For reserve cities, the minimum
population was 50,000.
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